

The Right to Work Issue In the New Millennium

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On a Saturday edition of CNN's heavily watched *Capital Gang* in January 1997, syndicated columnists Robert Novak and Mark Shields, the show's cohosts, were discussing the biggest political news item of the week: the unexpected conclusion of the race for the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee (RNC).

The day before, the 165 RNC members had chosen Colorado GOP Chairman Jim Nicholson to replace retiring RNC Chairman Haley Barbour. The outcome was a bitter disappointment for former New Hampshire Gov. Steve Merrill, who had emerged in late 1996 as the clear front-runner in the contest. The chief cause of Mr. Merrill's defeat was the intense grass-roots opposition of National Right to Work Committee members.

Mr. Novak was well aware why Right to Work members and supporters had opposed Mr. Merrill and urged RNC members to do the same. The former governor, argued Mr. Novak, "got in trouble because he hadn't supported Right to Work laws in New Hampshire. It's . . . a very big issue in the Republican party."

As a dyed-in-the-wool apologist for forced unionism, Mr. Shields naturally couldn't agree. Instead, he implied that the Right to Work cause had seen its day. But Mr. Novak countered that six decades after Congress had passed the Wagner Act and thus imposed forced unionism on the nation, the Right to Work movement was stronger than ever before.

"It's so old-fashioned," Mr. Novak concluded, "it's a brand new idea."¹

Political Appeal of Right to Work Issue Reaffirmed in Recent Congressional Election Cycles

Robert Novak got it right. During the 1990's, a popular backlash against so-called "striker replacement" legislation, which was designed to force employers to punish or fire workers who defy union-boss strike orders, had already played a significant role in toppling Big Labor Democratic leaders in both chambers of Congress.

Between 1991 and 1994, the U.S. House and Senate repeatedly cast recorded votes on the "Striker Replacement" Bill, which opponents called the "Pushbutton Strike" Bill. Enactment of this measure would have greatly expanded the union hierarchy's power to force workers to pay union dues as a job condition. A total of 40 House and Senate members who had voted with the union bosses were defeated when they sought reelection in 1992 or 1994.

In a previous study, the National Institute for Labor Relations Research documented how congressional election returns throughout the final third of the 20th

¹ January 18, 1997 *Capital Gang* transcript.

Century, up to and including the 2000 cycle, demonstrate the persistent and substantial political appeal of the Right to Work principle.² As this study shall recall, the power of the Right to Work issue was also shown, in perhaps an even more compelling way, during the 2002 and 2004 elections.

The Right to Work principle holds that both the employee's personal freedom to join and financially support a union and his or her freedom not to join or financially support a union deserve full protection under the law.

Rather than protect the freedom not to join and support a union without being fired as a consequence, federal law now actively opposes that freedom. However, at this writing, 22 states have enacted Right to Work laws that prohibit making forced union membership or forced union dues or "fees" a condition of employment.³

Since the mid 1990's, Right to Work members and other supporters of the Right to Work cause have been lobbying to build congressional support for national Right to Work legislation, which would repeal all federal labor-law provisions that directly violate employees' right not to join or financially support a union. Right to Work members also favor repeal of the federal authorization for union monopoly bargaining, a form of compulsory unionism that is more insidious than compulsory membership, dues and "fees," but extremely harmful in itself.

Government policy promotes monopoly bargaining, often euphemistically referred to as "exclusive representation," in the private sector in all 50 states. While states may override the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) authorization for forced union dues by passing Right to Work laws, no state may prohibit or regulate private-sector monopoly bargaining.

The NLRA and the Railway Labor Act (RLA) authorize union bosses to seek and obtain the power to bargain over the wages, benefits, and working conditions for all the production employees in a business or other federally-delineated "bargaining unit." Union nonmembers as well as members are subject to monopoly bargaining. Government policy (namely, the Federal Labor Relations Act, or FLRA) also favors "exclusive" union representation in federal employment, but the scope of Big Labor's federal monopoly-bargaining privileges is narrower than under the NLRA and RLA.

Monopoly bargaining alone does not legally force a worker to join a union. But it obviously does put him or her "under powerful compulsion to join," as then-top AFL-CIO lawyer Thomas Harris admitted back in the 1960's.⁴

Even in Right to Work states, where employees' right to refuse to pay dues or "fees" to an unwanted union is legally protected, federally-imposed monopoly bargaining authorizes private-sector and federal government union officials to represent the only "employee" perspective in contract negotiations. To have any say whatsoever in how

² Stan Greer, "History 101 — Right to Work: A Winning Issue," National Institute for Labor Relations Research, Springfield, Va., 2002. See especially pp. 10-13. Visit www.nilrr.org to obtain a copy.

³ See www.nrtwc.org – the National Right to Work Committee's web site – for a list of all the Right to Work states.

⁴ Thomas E. Harris, "The Anti-Union Warmongers," *AFL-CIO American Federationist*, February 1962, pagination unavailable.

those negotiations go, employees have to join the union, like it or not. Therefore, Right to Work laws in themselves do not ensure full freedom of choice.

In 2002 and 2004, the two most recent federal election cycles, the monopoly-bargaining issue, and not just Right to Work legislation per se, played a substantial role in congressional campaigns.

Taken together, the 2002 and 2004 cycles show that legislative showdowns over forced unionism continue to lead to political benefits for pro-Right to Work elected officials and candidates and political perils for their Big Labor rivals.

Senate Democrats Secured a ‘High-Profile Vote’ on the Homeland Security Bill ‘to Affirm Their Stance to [Big] Labor Supporters’

AFL-CIO President John Sweeney instigated the November 2002 showdown by attempting to expand monopoly bargaining in federal employment at a singularly inopportune time.

Earlier that year, President George W. Bush decided to accept Democratic congressional leaders’ proposal, which he had initially resisted, to establish a new, Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dedicated to preventing terrorist attacks on American soil. On July 26, 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill codifying Mr. Bush’s modification of the DHS proposal. Like the Democrats’ plan, it would merge the U.S. Coast Guard, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Border Patrol, the Secret Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and other agencies into the new DHS.

The labor provisions in the House-approved DHS bill quickly came under fire from Mr. Sweeney and top bosses of AFL-CIO-affiliated federal unions. However, they did not represent any dramatic change from longstanding pro-union monopoly policies. Since its 1978 enactment, the FLRA had always allowed the President to circumvent union monopoly-bargaining privileges over employees doing intelligence or national-security work if their jobs were deemed to be especially sensitive. The House bill (H.R. 5005) specified that the President would retain this discretion in the new DHS.⁵

To Mr. Sweeney, this was unacceptable. Together with other AFL-CIO officials, he publicly “condemned” H.R. 5005 and demanded that the Senate pass an alternative bill that would handcuff the President to prevent him from interfering with union bosses’ monopoly-bargaining privileges over tens of thousands of DHS employees.⁶

Then-Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) eagerly acquiesced to the AFL-CIO hierarchy’s demand, and virtually every Senate Democrat soon followed suit. As *USA Today* reported September 3, “Senate Democrats say they won’t agree to [the President’s homeland security] proposals on contentious issues such as . . . union

⁵ See <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/F?c107:3:./temp/~c107QY9a5o:e263180> for the text of Sec. 762, pertaining to labor-management relations, of H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Bill passed by the House in July 2002 (107th Congress).

⁶ AFL-CIO, “Resolution on the Department of Homeland Security,” August 6, 2002.

membership.”⁷ With Mr. Daschle’s encouragement, Sen. Joe Lieberman (D-Conn.) concocted an amendment to H.R. 5005 that would gut the President’s authority to exempt certain federal employees from union monopoly rule.

On September 26, Mr. Daschle called a cloture vote to shut down a Right to Work-backed filibuster against the Lieberman amendment. A 50-49 majority of senators, including every Democrat except Georgia’s Zell Miller, voted in favor of expanding federal monopoly bargaining, but this was 10 votes shy of the 60 needed to invoke cloture.⁸

Mr. Daschle and many other Democrats apparently thought this confrontation with the President, which blocked passage of legislation authorizing the Homeland Security Department until after the November elections, was smart politics. Weeks earlier, citing Democratic sources on Capitol Hill, a reporter for *Congressional Quarterly* had filed an article predicting:

“Senate Democrats will seek a high-profile vote during floor debate on the [Homeland Security] bill to affirm their stance to [Big] [L]abor supporters in advance of the mid-term elections.”⁹

‘The Democratic Leadership in the Senate . . . Put Sen. Cleland and Sen. Carnahan Into an Untenable Position’

Tom Daschle’s decision to utilize the imminent threat of new terrorist attacks on American soil as an opportunity to herd more federal employees under Big Labor monopoly control turned out to be a colossal political blunder. Democratic candidates lost the vast majority of the hotly contested Senate races on November 5, 2002. Democratic incumbents went down to defeat in Georgia and Missouri; former Vice President Walter Mondale failed to hold on to the late Democrat Paul Wellstone’s seat in Minnesota. And Democrats’ high hopes to capture open Senate seats in New Hampshire, North Carolina, Missouri, and Texas and Sen. Wayne Allard’s seat in Colorado were frustrated in every case.

As a consequence of the election results, Sen. Daschle was to descend from being the majority leader of a 51-member Senate caucus, including 50 Democrats and Democrat-friendly Vermont “Independent” Jim Jeffords, to being the minority leader of a 49-member caucus in January 2003.

Compounding his embarrassment was the agreement among a wide, ideologically diverse array of political commentators that the Senate confrontation over forced unionism in the Homeland Security Department hurt Democrats badly. Both politicians and pundits charged that it cost Max Cleland (Ga.) and Jean Carnahan (Mo.) their seats and may also have torpedoed the Senate candidacies of Mr. Mondale, Colorado lawyer Tom Strickland, and outgoing New Hampshire Democratic Gov. Jean Shaheen. (All four

⁷ Mimi Hall, “Bush Begins New Homeland Security Push Today,” *USA Today*, September 3, 2002.

⁸ See http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getpage.cgi?dbname=2002_record&page=S9401&position=all for the roll-call vote.

⁹ Adrielle Bettelheim, “Work Rules Throw Wrench in Homeland Security Bill,” *CQ Weekly*, August 3, 2002.

of these challengers, undoubtedly acting at union bosses' behest, publicly endorsed the Lieberman bill.)

In a post-election interview, Sen. Miller bluntly charged that Democratic officials had "miscalculated" the political impact of supporting expanded monopoly bargaining in national-security employment. "The Democratic leadership in the Senate . . . put Sen. Cleland and Sen. Carnahan into an untenable position. . . . I was puzzled why the Democratic leadership insisted on . . . making it [union monopoly bargaining in the DHS] such an issue" ¹⁰

Mr. Miller is a maverick Democrat who went on to endorse George W. Bush for reelection in 2004. However, his views were later echoed by Martin Frost, 12-term Texas congressman, former chairman of the Democratic Congressional Committee, and House Democratic caucus chairman in 2001 and 2002. In early 2003, Mr. Frost publicly admitted that the Democratic Senate losses in 2002 were caused by the "unusual" debate over homeland security. ¹¹ Similarly, *New Republic* editor-in-chief and Al Gore aficionado Martin Peretz concluded in his analysis of the election results:

The Democratic candidates – most affectingly Max Cleland in Georgia, most reflexively Fritz Mondale in Minnesota – put themselves in hock to the labor movement when they promised to support the insupportable: that a homeland security department be unionized. . . . I am not aware of a single Democratic candidate who demurred from this mad orthodoxy. ¹²

Another Democratic Party-oriented Beltway pundit, the *Washington Monthly's* Paul Glasris, declared that Democratic leaders' pro-monopoly bargaining stand "may have been the dumbest political mistake since Hillarycare. The resulting stalemate . . . cast Democrats as obstructionists pandering to their union base." ¹³

In yet another sign that Democratic insiders were widely aware that kowtowing to Big Labor in the fall of 2002 had hurt them politically, two weeks after the November election Louisiana Democrat Mary Landrieu switched her position and voted with 64 other senators to authorize a DHS without monopoly-bargaining expansion. (This incidentally sealed Big Labor's defeat on the legislative issue.) Ms. Landrieu was at the time running in a neck-and-neck "run-off" election to keep her Senate seat. Her pre-election "conversion" undoubtedly contributed to her 52%-48% victory over GOP challenger Suzanne Haik Terrell the following month.

Two Years Later, AFL-CIO Brass Ignored Lesson of 2002 – And Democratic Candidates Again Paid the Price

Senate votes on the Lieberman DHS Monopoly-Bargaining Amendment and the competing DHS legislation without monopoly bargaining were not the only legislative showdowns on the Right to Work issue in the 2001-2002 Congress.

¹⁰ Mark Preston, "Miller Blames Leaders for '02," *Roll Call*, February 17, 2003.

¹¹ Mark Murray, "On the Ropes," *National Journal*, March 8, 2003, pagination unavailable.

¹² Martin Peretz, "Seventies Kitch," *TNR Online*, November 6, 2002.

¹³ Paul Glasris, "How Democrats Could Have Won," *Washington Monthly Online*, December 2002.

In November 2001, the Senate cast a cloture vote to cut off a Right to Work filibuster against Sen. Ted Kennedy's (D-Mass.) Police/Fire Monopoly-Bargaining Bill (S. 952). The Kennedy Bill would have forced state and local police and firefighters nationwide to accept union officials as their "exclusive" contract bargaining agents. Mr. Kennedy and Majority Leader Daschle fell just three votes shy of killing the filibuster. By voting for the Kennedy scheme, Sen. Cleland and Sen. Carnahan opened themselves up to attacks on the forced-unionism issue. Their votes for the Lieberman Amendment further raised constituents' concerns that they were captive to union special interests.

Pushing for an expansion of monopoly bargaining in the DHS turned out to be a disaster for the AFL-CIO hierarchy. Republicans Saxby Chambliss (Ga.), Jim Talent (Mo.), and Norm Coleman (Minn.) won Senate seats that had been held by union-boss puppets after pledging to oppose public-sector monopoly bargaining. Big Labor failed to capture any of the open Senate seats it had targeted. Its only pick-up was in Arkansas, where pro-Right to Work GOP incumbent Tim Hutchinson was badly hurt by a personal scandal. The results would have been even worse for the union political machine had not union-label South Dakota Democrat Tim Johnson eked out a 524-vote victory over pro-Right to Work challenger John Thune.

One might suppose that, having recently seen their ally Tom Daschle ousted from his post as majority leader because of their monopoly-bargaining power grabs, union officials would have been more cautious going into the 2004 elections.

Instead, apparently convinced that 2002 was a fluke, the AFL-CIO relentlessly campaigned last year to arm-twist every federal Democratic candidate, especially candidates for the Senate, to oppose a national Right to Work law and to support and cosponsor the Card-Check Forced Unionism Bill (S. 1925/H.R. 3619).

Sponsored by Mr. Kennedy and pro-forced unionism Congressman George Miller (D-Calif.), S. 1925/ H.R. 3619 was designed to make it even easier for union officials to secure monopoly-bargaining privileges over independent-minded workers in the private sector. This bill was at the top of Big Labor's agenda in the 2003-2004 Congress. However, the card-check bill was such a flagrant power grab that it had the support of no significant constituency other than union officials.

Last year a nationwide poll found that, by a 53% to 41% majority, with the rest undecided, union members reject the notion that having "union organizers ask workers to sign their names on a card if they want a union" is "the fairest way to decide on a union."¹⁴ Yet greatly expanding union officials' power to secure monopoly-bargaining privileges through coercive card checks was the key provision in S. 1925/H.R. 3619. (At this writing, this measure has yet to be reintroduced in the current Congress.)

Given that the union bosses' top objective was unpopular even with its putative beneficiaries, John Sweeney and the rest of the AFL-CIO hierarchy would have been well advised to allow politicians who faced tough races to sit on the fence until the 2004 elections were over. Instead, union lobbyists demanded that their favored candidates, even in rock-solid Right to Work states, pledge their allegiance to Kennedy/Miller.

¹⁴ Mackinac Center For Public Policy, "Checking the Premises of Card Check: A Nationwide Survey of Union Members and Their Views on Labor Unions," Midland, Mich., July 20, 2004. (The poll was conducted by Zogby International.)

The end result was a debacle for forced-unionism proponents, as Right to Work allies enjoyed a net pick-up of six Senate seats in the November 2004 elections.

**AFL-CIO Lobbyist Explained in
October: The Card-Check Bill Is
A ‘Big, Big Deal For Us Out in the Field’**

But just a week-and-a-half before Election Day, the Bureau of National Affairs (BNA) in Washington, D.C., reported that AFL-CIO officials were very pleased with their success in convincing the candidates they backed to promise to cosponsor Kennedy/Miller if elected. “This [card-check bill] is a big, big deal for us out in the field,” especially in “competitive races,” explained AFL-CIO lobbyist Andy Levin. By mid-October, the AFL-CIO brass had “garnered pledges from virtually all Democratic candidates to cosponsor” the card-check bill. “We’ve pursued the candidates to get the commitment that they will cosponsor the bill. We’ve been largely successful at that,” boasted Mr. Levin.¹⁵

Among the union lobbying success stories cited by the BNA was Inez Tenenbaum, the self-styled “moderate” Democratic candidate running for South Carolina’s open Senate seat. A spokeswoman for Ms. Tenenbaum, who was campaigning hard “in a race . . . considered too close to call,” said that the candidate “supports the bill.”

The news spread that Ms. Tenenbaum supported the Kennedy/Miller Bill just as the National Right to Work Committee was launching a direct mail and ad program in the Palmetto State. The Committee’s message called attention to, among other things, the massive amounts of PAC cash and forced dues-funded “in-kind” support Big Labor was pumping into the Tenenbaum campaign.

The combined impact, according to an election post-mortem by Tenenbaum Communications Director Adam Kovacevich that was published on *National Review*’s web site November 4, was devastating:

Until a week ago, the race was essentially tied. So what happened? Inez was subjected to a week of unrelenting attacks on TV/radio/mail/newspapers. The . . . Right to Work Committee [and other citizens groups] came into the state with anti-Inez messages. . . . [Republican Senate nominee Jim] DeMint was aided tremendously by a flood of negative advertising from conservative groups in the final weeks¹⁶

On November 2, Mr. DeMint, who as a three-term congressman consistently supported a national Right to Work law barring all forced union dues and “fees” and other pro-Right to Work legislation, soundly defeated Ms. Tenenbaum by a 54% to 44% margin.

¹⁵ Fawn H. Johnson, “Virtually All Democratic Candidates Pledge to Co-Sponsor Card-Check Bill,” *Daily Labor Report Online*, Bureau of National Affairs, October 22, 2004.

¹⁶ John J. Miller, *S.C. Post Mortem*, The Corner on National Review Online, November 4, 2004, 9:29 A.M.

Big Labor's grim determination to exact public pro-forced unionism commitments from "friendly" candidates in every corner of the country similarly backfired in Right to Work Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Georgia.

Undoubtedly egged on by union lobbyists, Florida Democratic Senate nominee Betty Castor boasted on her web site of her opposition to a national Right to Work law and her support for the card-check scheme.¹⁷ Such candor obviously did her no good in the Sunshine State. She lost to pro-Right to Work Republican Mel Martinez, 50%-48%, whereas just four years earlier AFL-CIO-backed Democratic Senate candidate Bill Nelson had won 51%-46% while cagily concealing his views on the Right to Work issue. In Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Georgia, the Democratic Senate nominees were sitting House members who imprudently cosponsored Kennedy/Miller in states where forced unionism is extremely unpopular.

Record Indicates Right to Work Supporters Would Benefit by Upping the Ante in 2005 and 2006

In two other Right to Work states with close Senate races, North Carolina and South Dakota, Democratic nominees wisely resisted union lobbyists' demands to avow their fealty to Kennedy/Miller in public.

However, North Carolina nominee Erskine Bowles who served as a top official in the intensely pro-forced unionism Clinton Administration, couldn't hide his true stripes. And Senate Minority Leader Daschle had a 26-year record of Capitol Hill votes for forced unionism that was impossible to conceal from South Dakota voters. As tens of millions of Americans wondered whether union-label Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) would be the next President, voters evidently paid special attention to the Right to Work issue when making their Election Day choices in Senate races.

Right to Work allies consequently made a net pick-up of six Senate seats in 2004, capturing seats in Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Louisiana that had been held by senators with pro-forced unionism or mixed records on labor issues and defeating Mr. Daschle. The union political machine succeeded only in electing Big Labor Democrats to replace retiring Big Labor-appeasing GOP senators in Illinois and Colorado.

It's now clear that union strategists blundered by engineering the Senate showdown over DHS monopoly bargaining in 2002 and by browbeating the overwhelming majority of their favored Senate candidates to go on the record in support of the Card-Check Forced Unionism Bill in 2004. Largely because of these blunders, Right to Work Senate strength has grown significantly. Currently, 44 senators are on record either as having already supported a national Right to Work law or as having pledged to do so. At the beginning of the 2001-2002 Congress, just 37 senators had previously voted for, sponsored, or pledged to sponsor national Right to Work legislation.

Support for a national Right to Work measure has also gained ground in the House, where 172 members have cosponsored or pledged to cosponsor forced-dues

¹⁷ "A Strong Commitment to America's Workers," downloaded from the Betty Castor for U.S. Senate web site, September 21, 2004.

repeal. But change has so far been more muted in the House because Big Labor did not corral vulnerable House members seeking reelection to vote for DHS monopoly-bargaining expansion or to cosponsor the card-check bill.

In the new Congress, legislative showdowns on the Right to Work issue that benefit supporters are likely to come only if the GOP majority leadership initiates them. Union bosses probably won't again be so foolish over the next two years as to order friendly politicians across the nation to broadcast their support for forced unionism unless Big Labor's well-established special privileges are threatened. But legislation recently introduced by Congressman Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Sen. Trent Lott (R-Miss.) does constitute such a threat and would force Big Labor's hand.

The National Right to Work Act (H.R. 500/S. 370) in the 2005-2006 Congress is virtually identical to the Right to Work Bill (S. 1788) that came before the Senate in July 1996. That measure was defeated by a Ted Kennedy-led filibuster, but the union bosses' victory was costly. In that fall's elections, net Senate support for the Right to Work Bill increased by four votes, and in early 1997 Right to Work allies gained another supporter when Sen. Rod Grams (R-Minn.) publicly regretted his "no" ballot and announced he would vote for the bill in the future.

As we have seen, Senate support for the Right to Work Bill is now far greater than it was in 1996. The Right to Work vote itself, as well as the forced-unionism showdowns of 2001, 2002 and 2004 chronicled above, have taken their toll on Big Labor's legislative troops. The record thus strongly indicates that elected officials who oppose compulsory unionism now stand only to gain by upping the ante and holding recorded floor votes on H.R. 500/S. 370 in both chambers of Congress.

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The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is an organization whose primary function is to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It provides the supplementary analysis and research necessary to expose the inequities of compulsory unionism.

The Institute is classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a Section 501(c)(3) educational and research organization. Contributions and grants are tax deductible under Section 170 of the Code and are welcome from individuals, foundations, and corporations. The Institute will, upon request, provide documentation to substantiate tax-deductibility of a contribution or grant.

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Nothing here is to be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress or any state legislature.



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THE PROBLEM

Organized labor has had a profound economic and political impact on the institutions of American power. Yet the far-reaching ramifications of that impact are largely unknown to the public. Academic interest in labor unions and labor relations is at its lowest point in decades.

While there has been a notable proliferation of private interest groups in recent years, none has exposed the excesses of America's union establishment from an academic perspective. Consequently, not enough light has been shed on one of the few remaining forms of tyranny left in America: compulsory unionism.

THE NEED

Labor policy in America has not reflected the will of its citizenry for decades because Big Labor's support in the academic community has allowed it to control debate. As a result, labor unions have not been subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as their counterparts in the corporate world.

In many cases, the interests and concerns of Americans who support the right to work without compulsion are ignored for lack of an academic support structure. Freedom of association has diminished because its proponents frequently are without the analysis and research necessary to effectively make their case.

Obviously, there is an urgent need for an organization that will draw together scholars and economists to perform objective and revealing research into the practices of America's labor unions. The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is such an organization.

THE PROGRAM

1. The Institute's primary function will be to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It will provide the supplementary analysis and research necessary to expose the inequities of compulsory unionism.

2. It will publish monographs, brochures and briefing papers designed to stimulate research and discussion with easy-to-read summaries of current events. The Institute will also conduct nonpartisan analysis and study for the benefit of the general public.

3. It will render aid gratuitously to individuals suffering from government over-regulation of labor relations and will provide educational assistance to those individuals who have proved themselves worthy thereof.

It is high time that self-interested union officials be confronted with the facts on how their brand of unionism has failed to improve general conditions for workers. With an intensive program of study and education, the National Institute for Labor Relations Research intends to do just that.

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