



# **‘Card-Check’ Forced-Unionism Bill Would Hurt Employees and Employers**

**Author:  
Stan Greer**

February 2008

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**NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH**

5211 Port Royal Road, Suite 510

Springfield, Virginia 22151

Tel: 703-321-9606

Fax: 703-321-7143

Research@nilrr.org

[www.nilrr.org](http://www.nilrr.org)

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**By Stan Greer, Senior Research Associate**

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## **About the Author**

Stan Greer serves as senior research associate for the National Institute for Labor Relations Research. Mr. Greer holds a bachelor's degree (1983) from Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and a master's degree (1986) from the University of Pittsburgh.

## **About the Organization**

The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is an organization whose primary function is to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It provides the supplementary analysis and research necessary to understand and deal with the problems associated with compulsory unionism.

The Institute is classified by the Internal Revenue Service as a Section 501(c)(3) educational and research organization. Contributions and grants are tax deductible under Section 170 of the Code and are welcome from individuals, foundations, and corporations. The Institute will, upon request, provide documentation to substantiate tax-deductibility of a contribution or grant.

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Nothing here is to be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress or any state legislature.

## Executive Summary

For years, scientific opinion polls have shown that Americans overwhelmingly oppose federal labor laws that empower union officials to represent all employees in a company unit and deny union nonmembers the right to bargain for themselves. But Organized Labor's top priority in the 2007-2008 Congress, the inaptly named "Employee Free Choice Act," would rewrite federal labor law to make it even easier for union officials to secure monopoly-bargaining privileges over employees.

Well aware that the American people oppose monopoly unionism, union officials are citing their legislation's allegedly beneficial economic effects as the key reason for passing it. However, even a cursory look at the contrasting economic track records of states in which a relatively high share of employees are under union monopoly bargaining and states in which monopoly bargaining is relatively rare shows this case is phony.

The record shows that the prevalence of union monopoly bargaining is correlated with lower real incomes, higher living costs, slower growth in jobs and job benefits, and higher unemployment. The evidence is overwhelming that enactment of federal legislation that is designed to put millions of additional workers under union monopoly-bargaining control would be economically harmful, not beneficial.

If Congress really wants to bolster the U.S. economy and help employees and businesses, it should instead revise federal labor law to ensure that it respects the ability of each individual employee to choose whether or not to be represented by and furnish financial support for a labor union.

## Introduction: Big Labor Tries to ‘Sell’ Monopoly Unionism

Much that is written about American labor unions is misleading because it assumes they operate like other private, nonprofit organizations.

In key respects, this assumption is false. For example, affiliation with private organizations is, the vast majority of the time, a purely personal decision. But under federal labor law and the labor laws of most states, union affiliation is primarily a collective, rather than a personal, decision.

Under American traditions of limited government, your decision to contribute your household’s money to a charity, a political campaign, or a single-issue lobbying organization is made individually, or together with your spouse or solicitor. Your neighbors, fellow employees, or business associates may offer advice, but do not get a chance to vote on which private groups you support or don’t support.

But U.S. labor laws empower pro-union employees who constitute the majority within a government-delineated “bargaining unit” to force other employees within that unit who don’t want a union to accept a particular union as their “exclusive” (monopoly) bargaining agent in dealings with their employer. Furthermore, once a monopoly-bargaining agent is in place, under federal law it and the employer are legally authorized to agree to fire employees who refuse to pay monthly dues or fees to the union.

Apologists for current labor laws typically cite the “majority rule” principle as the rationale for forcing unwanted union monopoly bargaining and forced union dues or fees on employees who don’t wish to join a union. But under our constitutional system, majority rule normally controls only the affairs of government or the *internal* affairs of a private association. The invocation of majority rule to force unwilling persons into membership in or financial support for a private organization is not normally accepted.

For example, the decision by the majority of businesses based in a small town to join and pay dues to the Chamber of Commerce doesn’t give them the legal power, under any federal or state statute, to force the remaining businesses to join or pay dues.

Monopoly bargaining is well-entrenched as a matter of law, and has been for decades, but whether it is sound policy is another matter completely. In recent years, a number of allies of Organized Labor and former union officials have openly acknowledged doubts about whether monopoly bargaining, as currently authorized by federal and many state labor laws, is in workers’ best interest.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, opinion polls have shown for many years that the general public overwhelmingly opposes monopoly bargaining in principle.

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<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., “Toward a New Labor Rights Movement,” an article by law professor James Pope, former local textile workers union boss Peter Kellman, and former electricians union national organizing director Ed Bruno, *WorkingUSA*, Spring 2001, pp. 8-33, esp. p. 26.

For example, a December 2006 nationwide survey on the monopoly-bargaining issue, commissioned by the National Institute for Labor Relations Research and conducted by veteran pollster Del Ali and his firm Research 2000, posed the following question:

As you know, labor unions are permitted to represent all employees in a company unit. Do you believe that employees who do not want to be represented by a labor union should or should not have the right to bargain for themselves?

The scientific Research 2000 poll found that 81% of Americans who regularly vote in statewide elections believe that employees in unionized businesses who do not want to be union-represented should retain the right to bargain for themselves. Just 17% of regular voters in statewide elections believe employees should not have that right, while 2% are unsure.<sup>2</sup>

## ‘Card-Check’ Bills Designed To Expand Monopoly-Bargaining System

Clearly, the American people are against monopoly bargaining. But Big Labor is vehemently for it. Not only that, union officials and their apologists want far more of it. In 2007, according to U.S. Labor Department data, 8.87 million private-sector workers were under union monopoly-bargaining control. The top item on Big Labor’s legislative wish list for the 2007-2008 Congress is designed to enable union organizers to secure monopoly-bargaining power over millions of now-independent private-sector employees.

This measure has been introduced in the 2007-2008 Congress as H.R. 800 and as S. 1041, respectively, by pro-forced unionism Congressman George Miller (D-Calif.) and Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.). Mr. Miller and Mr. Kennedy cynically label their legislation as the “Employee Free Choice Act.” The Miller measure was rubber-stamped on March 1, 2007, by a 241-185 House majority, with a coalition of Big Labor and Big Labor-appeasing representatives supporting the bill. Less than four months later, on June 27, 51 out of the 100 U.S. senators voted to cut off debate on, and thus clear the way for passage of, H.R. 800. However, H.R. 800 did not secure the 60 votes needed to prevent Right to Work allies from continuing the debate. Consequently, Miller-Kennedy has yet to steamroll the Senate.

Key provisions in the Miller-Kennedy legislation, more accurately labeled as the Card-Check Forced-Unionism Bills, would effectively ban employee secret-ballot elections over unionization in the private sector and replace such elections with so-called “card checks.”

“Card-check” organizing is already a favorite Big Labor tactic, but as yet isn’t mandated by federal law. It empowers union officials to force a business’s employees to accept a union as their monopoly-bargaining agent solely through the acquisition of signed union authorization cards. Big Labor may resort to deceit or intimidation to get individual workers to sign themselves, and, ultimately, all of their nonunion fellow employees, over to

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<sup>2</sup> To obtain a brief report detailing the poll results and methodology, call the National Institute for Labor Relations Research at 703-321-9606.

union-boss control. Authorization cards are typically signed while workers are standing under the peering eyes of union organizers.

Law-abiding employers who do not want their independent-minded employees to be subject to union monopoly rule may currently insist that all affected employees at least get the chance to hear why unionization might not be in their best interests and to vote in a secret-ballot election before a union is granted “exclusive” bargaining privileges. But the Miller-Kennedy Bill would eliminate that small safeguard. Consequently, during unionization drives, only the views workers express while being monitored by union officials would count.<sup>3</sup>

Forced-unionism apologists sometimes concede that, in principle, secret-ballot elections are fairer than “elections” in which your “vote” is monitored by agents of one of the opposing parties.

In an August 2001 letter to Mexican government officials who oversee labor policy in the state of Puebla, Rep. Miller, the lead sponsor of the House version of the Card-Check Forced-Unionism Bill, and 15 other Big Labor congressmen and women wrote that in union recognition drives “the secret ballot is absolutely necessary . . . .” Without the secret ballot, they explained, workers may be “intimidated into voting for a union they might not otherwise choose.”<sup>4</sup>

And in the U.S. as well as in Mexico, union officials insist that unionized employees be given a chance to cast a secret-ballot vote before a union is *decertified*, even if most have already signed a petition opposing the union. Indeed, the AFL-CIO hierarchy actually joined a 1998 brief to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that, approvingly citing federal court precedents, criticized decertification petitions and cards as “not comparable to the privacy and independence of the voting booth.” The union lawyer-authored brief forcefully argued that the secret-ballot “election system provides the surest means of avoiding decisions which are ‘the result of group pressures and not individual decision[s].’”<sup>5</sup> And just last year, union lobbyists strongly opposed, and Big Labor-backed Democrats unanimously voted against, a committee amendment to H.R. 800 sponsored by Rep. John Kline (R-Minn.) that would have mandated card checks for decertification campaigns, just as H.R. 800 itself mandates them for unionization drives.<sup>6</sup>

As the National Institute for Labor Relations Research has previously pointed out, AFL-CIO and other union officials are not pushing hard to advance and ultimately enact the Miller-Kennedy Bill out of a sincere, albeit bizarre, belief that card checks are somehow more fair than secret-ballot elections.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Go to <http://thomas.loc.gov/home/multicongress/multicongress.html> and enter “Employee Free Choice Act” into the bill-name box to locate and review the 2007-8 Miller-Kennedy bills. See especially Sec. 2, “Streamlining Union Certification.”

<sup>4</sup> Letter to the Junta Local de Conciliación y Arbitraje del Estado de Puebla, August 29, 2001.

<sup>5</sup> Joint brief of the United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, the United Food and Commercial Workers, and the AFL-CIO in *Chelsea Industries and Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc.*, Nos. 7-CA-36846, 7-CA-37016 and 20-CA-26596 (NLRB).

<sup>6</sup> House Report 110-203 – Employee Free Choice Act, available at [http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp110&sid=cp1100AFa6&refer=&r\\_n=hr023.110&item=&sel=TOC\\_138461&](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp110&sid=cp1100AFa6&refer=&r_n=hr023.110&item=&sel=TOC_138461&).

<sup>7</sup> See <http://www.nilrr.org/node/72> (“Big Labor’s Cockamamie Campaign Against Secret-Ballot Elections For Workers”) for details.

Instead, Big Labor is obviously acting on the belief that enactment of Miller-Kennedy will enable union organizers to secure monopoly-bargaining power over millions, perhaps even tens of millions, of now-independent private-sector employees. Pro-forced unionism California academics Peter Dreier and Kelly Candaele were especially frank about the intent of this legislation in an op-ed they coauthored last year:

[Miller-Kennedy] is understandably the top priority for America's labor unions. . . . It would . . . mak[e] it more likely for unions to win organizing drives in workplaces.

But why should other constituencies rally behind this effort . . . ? The reason is simple. . . . [Organized] labor is still the most effective political force for electing liberal candidates at the local, state and federal levels. Once in office, pro-[organized] labor politicians are typically also the strongest advocates of . . . [increased taxpayer] funding for public schools and higher education . . . , gay rights, [and] universal [taxpayer-funded] health insurance . . . .<sup>8</sup>

## Real Weekly Earnings and Disposable Income Negatively Correlated With Union Monopoly

In the eyes of union officials and their ideological champions, the goal of dramatically increasing the number of unionized employees is unquestionably noble. Therefore, they imply, no one should focus too long on the proposed means. But they have a big problem. By an overwhelming majority, employees don't support increased unionization at any cost.

For example, a June 2005 nationwide telephone survey of employees, covering a number of labor-relations topics and conducted by pollster John Zogby, found that employees oppose efforts to prevent employers from saying or doing "anything that might discourage employees from seeking union representation." By nearly a two-to-one margin, employees agreed that during union organizing campaigns "employers should be able to provide employees information about unions and the potential impact of unionizing" on their jobs.<sup>9</sup>

Union officials and other forced-unionism apologists have been unable to convince a majority of employees, let alone the general public, to support eliminating secret ballots or the employer's perspective on unionization, pro- or con-, from the union campaign process. Now they are trying to shift the focus of the debate to the alleged economic benefits that Americans generally would derive if millions of additional workers were forced to accept a union as their monopoly-bargaining agent.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Dreier and Kelly Candaele, "Labor Law Reform Not Just for Unions," posted on TomPaine.com, May 10, 2007.

<sup>9</sup> Christian W. Peck, "The Attitudes and Opinions of Unionized and Non-Unionized Workers Employed in Various Sectors of the Economy Toward Organized Labor," Zogby International, August 2005, p. 30. Visit <http://www.psrfr.org/info/zogby2005.jsp> to obtain a copy of the entire survey, which was commissioned by the Public Service Research Foundation, based in Vienna, Va.

For example, Dreier and Candaele glibly claim that enactment of Miller-Kennedy “. . . would mean better wages, benefits and working conditions for all employees.”<sup>10</sup>

Unfortunately for the union hierarchy, Big Labor propaganda claims about the alleged economic benefits of increasing the number of workers subject to union monopoly bargaining are no more convincing than its case that secret-ballot elections in the workplace are “unfair” and must be eliminated. To the contrary, considerable evidence suggests that a new federal law promoting monopoly unionism would actually lower real earnings and incomes, hinder job creation, and reduce the availability of important job benefits like health insurance.

Some of the potential harm that would be wrought by the Miller-Kennedy Bill can be seen by contrasting real earnings levels, job growth, and other key economic indices in states where private-sector monopoly bargaining is most prevalent with indices in states where it is least prevalent.<sup>11</sup>

In 2006, cost of living-adjusted average weekly earnings in the 15 states with the highest share of private-sector employees subject to union monopoly bargaining were \$722, \$31 less than the average in the 15 states with the lowest share of private-sector employees under Big Labor control. That comes to a more than \$1600-a-year disadvantage for full-time employees in states with high monopoly-bargaining density.<sup>12</sup>

Residents of low monopoly-bargaining-density states also enjoy higher real per capita disposable income.<sup>13</sup> When adjusted for cost of living, 2006 disposable per capita income in the 15 states with the lowest share of private-sector workers under monopoly bargaining was \$31,722, compared to just \$29,058 in the 15 states where Organized Labor enjoyed the most

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<sup>10</sup> See Footnote 8, *supra*.

<sup>11</sup> For data on overall and private-sector union density levels in the 50 states, go to [www.unionstats.com](http://www.unionstats.com) – a web site maintained by Drs. Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson. The Hirsch-Macpherson site is the source for all the union density data cited in this study.

<sup>12</sup> For mean weekly earnings in the 50 states, see Hirsch and Macpherson, *Union Membership and Earnings Data Book: Compilations from the Current Population Survey (2007 Edition)*, Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), Washington, D.C., 2006, pp. 30-35. For the 2005 interstate cost-of-living index used to adjust weekly earnings, see Kendra A. and Harold A. Hovey, *CQ's State Fact Finder 2007*, CQ Press, Washington, D.C., 2007, p. 51. For the total number of private-sector employees in each state, this analysis used BNA data, not the Labor Department's. One low monopoly-bargaining-density state, New Hampshire, is left out of this analysis, because the *CQ State Fact Finder* has no cost-of-living index for it. Since the Granite State has a relatively small number of employees, its inclusion could not substantially change the result.

<sup>13</sup> The Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates disposable personal income as “personal income less personal tax and nontax payments.” A higher share of personal income is disposable in low monopoly-bargaining-density states, partly because state and local tax burdens are generally lower than in high-monopoly-bargaining-density states. Another important factor is that progressive income tax rates are levied on nominal, rather than real, incomes. According to the cost-of-living index cited in Footnote 12, living costs are on average 22% higher in the 15 states with the highest share of unionized workers than they are in the 15 states with the lowest share. Therefore, a family in one of the low-density states that has the same spendable pre-tax income as a similar family in a high-density state will typically have to fork over a significantly smaller share of its income to the federal government.

monopoly power.<sup>14</sup>

Further confirmation that real incomes are negatively correlated with the prevalence of union monopoly control over the workforce is furnished by a “conservative adjustment” of official federal poverty rates calculated in 2006 for the San Francisco-based Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) to account for regional differences in living costs.<sup>15</sup>

Economist Deborah Reed and two research assistants calculated poverty rates that take into account the great disparities in housing costs in the 50 states as part of an effort to provide a more realistic assessment of the poverty problem in California than the one furnished by federal data that do not factor in cost-of-living differences.

Reed’s data show that the aggregate, cost-of-living adjusted poverty rate over the 2002 to 2004 period for the 15 lowest monopoly-bargaining-density states was 12.1%, compared to 12.6% for the 15 highest monopoly-bargaining-density states.<sup>16</sup>

## Private-Sector Job Growth Nearly Three Times as Fast in Low Union-Monopoly States

The negative correlation between Big Labor coercive power and real incomes is consistent. This evidence is devastating to card-check proponents’ oft-repeated claims that expanding the number of employees under union monopoly control is key for maintaining economic prosperity. Furthermore, an array of indices that measure growth indicate that the economic damage inflicted by forced unionism is far more severe than income data alone would reveal.

To compare growth rates, it is appropriate to look at the subsequent performances of the states that had the lowest and highest monopoly-bargaining densities in the past.

Over the decade ending in 2006, the 15 states that started out in 1996 with the lowest share of their private-sector workers subject to union monopoly bargaining enjoyed an aggregate private-sector job growth of 21.3%, nearly triple the combined 8.4% growth of the 15 states with the highest monopoly-bargaining densities as of 1996.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Disposable personal income data are found in the U.S. Census Bureau’s *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2008*, p. 440. They are adjusted for cost of living according to the index cited in Footnote 12. Once again, New Hampshire is omitted. To calculate aggregate average per capita disposable income for low and high monopoly-bargaining-density states, states are weighted according to their 2006 population. See <http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html> on the Census Bureau (U.S. Department of Commerce) web site to find state population data for every year from 2000 to 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Deborah Reed, “Poverty in California: Moving Beyond the Federal Measure,” *California Counts*, May 2006, published by the Public Policy Institute of California.

<sup>16</sup> Although cost of living-adjusted poverty rates for selected states are cited in Reed’s published study, data for all 50 states are not included. However, the PPIC kindly furnished the National Institute for Labor Relations Research with the full list of adjusted poverty rates calculated by Reed.

<sup>17</sup> Go to <http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?sm> on the Bureau of Labor Statistics web site to access private-sector employment data for all 50 states.

And the vast majority of new jobs created in low-union-monopoly states are highly productive, allowing employers to offer important benefits like health insurance and at the same time be duly rewarded for risking capital. Between 1999 and 2006, the number of citizens in low-union-monopoly states covered by private health insurance increased by 3.9%. But coverage fell by 2.3% in high-union-monopoly states.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to enjoying faster long-term growth, low-union-monopoly states are generally better able to weather the storms of economic downturns and even recoveries. From 2000 to 2003, when the nation as a whole was hit by a slowdown, a recession, and what at first seemed to be a “job-loss” recovery, private-sector payroll jobs in high-union monopoly states fell by nearly 1.6 million, or 3.1%. But payroll employment in low-union-monopoly states fell by just a little over 500,000, or 1.7%.<sup>19</sup>

Not surprisingly, by 2003 the average unemployment rate in the states with the lowest share of private-sector workers under union monopoly control was significantly lower than in the states with the highest share: 5.7% vs. 6.3%.<sup>20</sup>

The gap would undoubtedly have been far larger had not hundreds of thousands of job seekers recently moved out of high-union-monopoly states to seek opportunities where Big Labor wields less coercive control over the labor market. Between April 2000 and July 2003, high-union-monopoly states lost a net of more than 1.1 million employees, their family members, and other citizens to other states. Meanwhile, a net of nearly 1.1 million employees and other citizens moved into low-union-monopoly states.<sup>21</sup>

## Equal Protection For Right Not to Join a Union Makes Moral and Economic Sense

Current federal labor policy strongly discourages employers from withdrawing a union’s monopoly-bargaining privilege simply because a majority of employees have signed a petition or cards indicating they no longer wish to be union-represented.<sup>22</sup> That’s why employers who don’t wish to be hauled before the NLRB routinely file for an employee secret-ballot vote instead of heeding requests from a majority of employees to withdraw union recognition.

As we have seen above, Big Labor’s use of card checks for the purpose of obtaining monopoly-bargaining privileges is not similarly discouraged under current law. As long as the employer acquiesces, it is encouraged. Miller-Kennedy, which is designed to expand

<sup>18</sup> See <http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hlthins/historic/index.html>, Table HI-4, for U.S. Census data on private, employment-based health insurance in all 50 states between 1999 and 2006. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for years prior to 1999.

<sup>19</sup> See Footnote 17.

<sup>20</sup> U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Earnings*, May 2004 issue, p. 199.

<sup>21</sup> U.S. Census Bureau, *Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004-5*, Washington, D.C., 2004, p. 22.

<sup>22</sup> See *Levitz Furniture Co. of the Pacific, Inc.*, 333 NLRB 717 (2001) ([www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared\\_files/decisions/333/333-105.pdf](http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/decisions/333/333-105.pdf)).

sharply Big Labor's use of card checks for the purpose of obtaining monopoly-bargaining privileges, represents another large step in the direction away from equal protection for the individual employee's right to join or not join a union.

In contrast, legislation introduced in the 2007-2008 Congress as H.R. 866 and S. 1312 by the late Congressman Charlie Norwood (R-Ga.) and Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), respectively, is a step toward equal protection. It would require that private-sector unions clear the hurdle of a secret-ballot election before they are granted monopoly-bargaining privileges. But the National Right to Work Act (H.R. 697 and S. 1301), introduced in the 110th Congress last year by Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.) and Sen. DeMint, represents a much more fundamental change in labor policy.

It would protect employees' unconditional right to refuse to join or pay dues or fees to an unwanted union, just as the right to join and pay dues is already protected by current law.<sup>23</sup>

While the record shows that compulsory union membership and dues as well as union monopoly bargaining are correlated with lower real incomes, higher living costs, slower growth in jobs and job benefits, and higher unemployment, the forced-unionism issue is fundamentally one of freedom: Should federal labor law respect the ability of each individual employee to choose whether or not to be represented by and furnish financial support for a labor union?

Poll after poll has shown that nearly four out of five Americans support the individual employee's Right to Work regardless of his or her union affiliation.<sup>24</sup>

Union officials who disagree should at least be willing to offer a straightforward explanation why that's based on principle, instead of making unsupported and false claims about the economic impact of union monopoly control over the workplace.

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<sup>23</sup> Go to <http://thomas.loc.gov> and enter H.R. 697 and S. 1301 to review the Right to Work legislation. Enter H.R. 866 and S. 1312 to review the legislation prohibiting card checks.

<sup>24</sup> See, e.g. "Right to Work's Public Support Hits New High," ([www.nrtwc.org/nl/nl-53.pdf](http://www.nrtwc.org/nl/nl-53.pdf)), *National Right to Work Newsletter*, April 2004, p. 3.



## NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOR RELATIONS RESEARCH

5211 Port Royal Road, Suite 510 • Springfield, Virginia 22151 • 703-321-9606 • www.nilrr.org • research@nilrr.org

### THE PROBLEM

Organized labor has had a profound economic and political impact on the institutions of American power. Yet the far-reaching ramifications of that impact are largely unknown to the public. Academic interest in labor unions and labor relations is at its lowest point in decades.

While there has been a notable proliferation of private interest groups in recent years, none has exposed the excesses of America's union establishment from an academic perspective. Consequently, not enough light has been shed on one of the few remaining forms of tyranny left in America: compulsory unionism.

### THE NEED

Labor policy in America has not reflected the will of its citizenry for decades because Big Labor's support in the academic community has allowed it to control debate. As a result, labor unions have not been subjected to the same degree of scrutiny as their counterparts in the corporate world.

In many cases, the interests and concerns of Americans who support the right to work without compulsion are ignored for lack of an academic support structure. Freedom of association has diminished because its proponents frequently are without the analysis and research necessary to effectively make their case.

Obviously, there is an urgent need for an organization that will draw together scholars and economists to perform objective and revealing research into the practices of America's labor unions. The National Institute for Labor Relations Research is such an organization.

### THE PROGRAM

**1.** The Institute's primary function will be to act as a research facility for the general public, scholars and students. It will provide the supplementary analysis and research necessary to expose the inequities of compulsory unionism.

**2.** It will publish monographs, brochures and briefing papers designed to stimulate research and discussion with easy-to-read summaries of current events. The Institute will also conduct nonpartisan analysis and study for the benefit of the general public.

**3.** It will render aid gratuitously to individuals suffering from government over-regulation of labor relations and will provide educational assistance to those individuals who have proved themselves worthy thereof.

It is high time that self-interested union officials be confronted with the facts on how their brand of unionism has failed to improve general conditions for workers. With an intensive program of study and education, the National Institute for Labor Relations Research intends to do just that.

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